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In philosophy of science, formal epistemology, and related areas, confirmation has become
a key technical term. Broadly speaking, confirmation has to do with how evidence affects
the credibility of hypotheses, an issue that is crucial to human reasoning in a variety of
domains, from scientific inquiry to medical diagnosis, legal argumentation, and beyond. In
what follows, we will address probabilistic theories of confirmation. The case for tackling
confirmation in a probabilistic framework is easily put. The connection between evidence
and hypothesis is typically fraught with uncertainty, and probability is widely recognized as
the formal representation of uncertainty that is best understood and motivated. We will
thus frame our discussion by positing a set P of probability functions representing possible
states of belief concerning a domain described in a (finite) propositional language L.Wewill
also denote asLc the set of contingent formulae inL (namely, those expressing neither logical
truths nor logical falsehoods), and we will have hypothesis h and evidence e belonging to
Lc. Finally, P will be assumed to include all regular probability functions that can be defined
over L (i.e., such that, for any α ∈ Lc and any P ∈ P,  < P( α) < ).
 Although well-established, probabilistic confirmation theory has not always been popular, nor has it
remained unchallenged even in recent times. For prominent critical voices, see Kelly andGlymour ()
and Norton (). As regards earlier influential and non-probabilistic accounts of confirmation, one
should mention at least Popper’s () notion of “corroboration” through bold successful predictions
and Hempel’s () analysis of confirmation by instances.There also exist cases which tend to defy the
distinction between advocates and critics of probabilistic confirmation theory: Isaac Levi’swork is amajor
example (e.g., Levi ). Finally, there are authors who rely on probability to account for evidential
reasoning, but not as a representation of belief under uncertainty (as is the case throughout this chapter).
This applies, for instance, to Royall’s () likelihoodism, as well as to Mayo’s () error-theoretic
approach. Also see Crupi () for a more extensive discussion.
 Regularity can be motivated as a way to represent credences that are non-dogmatic (see Howson
: p. ). It is a very convenient assumption, but not an entirely innocent one. Festa () and
Kuipers () discuss some limiting cases that are left aside here owing to this constraint.
